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  Arriving at fair and impartial judgements is an important objective of legal proceedings. Often 
different pieces of evidence of different degrees of credibility and certainty are submitted. Then 
a court “weighs” the evidence and eventually arrives at a conclusion. We consider the following 
fundamental question: Exactly how should evidence be weighed? Merely mentioning evidence 
does not constitute weighing evidence. Standard textbooks concerned with the Law of 
Evidence do not address this particular topic. The use of probability theory comes to mind. 
The well-known “Blue and green taxicabs” example (see [1]) will show us how a situation may 
be analysed using probability theory.  
 
Example 1  
 
Two taxicab companies operate in a certain city after sunset. The Blue Cab Company deploys 
15 blue cabs, and the Green Cab Company deploys 85 green cabs. On a rainy night in an 
empty street with orange street lighting a parked car was damaged by a cab as it carelessly 
scraped past the car. The cab then drove off. An eye witness who observed the incident from 
some distance away testified that a blue cab was involved. The witness was subsequently 
tested under similar conditions in an effort to establish the crediblity of his testimony. It was 
found that the witness could correctly identify the true colour of a cab with probability 80% (see 
[2]). Which taxicab company should be held accountable for damages?  
 
In this example there are two pieces of evidence pointing in opposite directions. On the one 
hand there were many more green cabs on the streets than blue cabs. This is motivation for 
the point of view that more likely a green cab was involved in the accident. However, on the 
other hand there was fairly reliable evidence by an eye witness who testified that a blue cab 
was involved. So how should available evidence be weighed to arrive at the best conclusion? 
 
Solution 1 (Counting cabs)  
 
Under the prevailing conditions the eye witness would have identified about 80% of the 15 
blue cabs (i.e. 12 blue cabs) as being “blue”, and he would have identified about 20% of the 
85 green cabs (i.e. 17 green cabs) as being “blue”. So he would have identified altogether 
about  12 + 17 = 29  of the 100 cabs as being “blue”.  
 
The probability that a blue cab was involved in the accident is therefore  
 
𝟏𝟐
𝟏𝟐 + 𝟏𝟕
   =  0.413  (=  41.3%).  
 
Since 41.3% is below 50%, the correct inference is that a blue cab was probably not involved 
in the accident. The Green Cab Company should therefore be held accountable for damages. 
 
Solution 2 (Using probabilities)  
 
This is a more general approach which also leads to the outcome obtained in Solution 1.  
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Let  A1 , B  and  ~B  be the following events:  
 
    A1  :   the eye witness testifies that a blue cab was involved in the accident,  
    B   :   a blue cab was involved in the accident,  
   ~B  :   a green cab was involved in the accident.  
 
We are given the following probabilities: P(B) = 0.15,  P(~B) = 0.85,  P(A1|B) = 0.8  and  
P(A1|~B) = 0.2 . 
 
P(A1|B) is the conditional probability that the eye witness testifies that a blue cab was involved 
in the accident, given the event that the cab was blue. Similarly,  P(A1|~B) is the conditional 
probability that the eye witness testifies that a blue cab was involved in the accident, given the 
event that the cab was green. But we are more concerned with P(B|A1), the conditional 
probability that the cab was indeed blue, given the event that the witness testified that a blue 
cab was involved in the accident.  
 
By Bayes’s theorem,  
 
 P(B|A1)   =   
𝑷(𝑩)𝑷(𝑨𝟏|𝑩)
𝑷(𝑩)𝑷(𝑨𝟏|𝑩)  +  𝑷(~𝑩)𝑷(𝑨𝟏|~𝑩)
  
 
     =   
(𝟎.𝟏𝟓)(𝟎.𝟖)
(𝟎.𝟏𝟓)(𝟎.𝟖)  +  (𝟎.𝟖𝟓)(𝟎.𝟐)
  
 
     =   0.413   (=  41.3%) .  
 
Bayes’s theorem gives us the same conclusion as the one arrived at in Solution 1. The Green 
Cab Company should therefore be held accountable for damages.  
 
Remark  
 
Many people might feel uneasy that the probability that a blue cab was involved in the accident 
turns out to be less than 50%. They typically think “A reliable witness testified that he saw a 
blue cab. Surely the probability P(B|A1) should then be above 50%?” This type of reasoning is 
seriously flawed. If someone mistakenly thinks that P(B|A1) should be above 50%, an incorrect 
conclusion is drawn because an assessment of the probability of a proposition is confused 
with the strength of the evidence for the proposition. This error is known as the prosecutor’s 
fallacy.  Solution 2 shows that  P(B|A1) = 0.413 (=  41.3%), but  P(A1|B) = 0.8 (=  80%).  
 
We tend to forget that the witness’s testimony is only 80% reliable. The further mistake made 
in such reasoning is that the respective numbers of green and blue cabs on the streets are 
not taken into consideration.  Using Bayes’s theorem avoids making these mistakes.  
 
Other ways of weighing evidence  
 
In more complicated examples we may also use methods based on Bayes’s theorem which 
can be formulated in terms of odds and likelihood ratios (see [3]), or methods involving 
Bayesian networks (see [4]).  Computer software is available to facilitate matters, especially if 
we have to weigh interconnected pieces of evidence. By all the above methods at our disposal 
we would have arrived at the same conclusion to Example 1.  
 
Example 2  
 
This example is an extension of Example 1 and we assume everything that was given in 
Example 1.  At a later stage an independent second witness comes forward. Suppose that he 
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also testifies that he saw a blue cab involved in the accident. And under the prevailing 
conditions this second eye witness also correctly identifies the true colour of a cab with 
probability 80%.  Which taxicab company should then be held accountable for damages?  
 
Solution of Example 2  
 
In Example 1 (with one eye witness) it was shown that the probability that a blue cab was 
involved in the accident is 41.3%. Now there is an independent second eye witness testifying 
the same as the first eye witness. Of course the effect will be that the posterior probability that 
a blue cab was involved will now be above 41.3%.  But how far above?  
 
Let A2 be the event that the second witness testifies that a blue cab was involved in the 
accident. As in Solution 2 of Example 1, we know that  P(A2|B) = 0.8  and  P(A2|~B) = 0.2 . 
 
By Bayes’s theorem the posterior probability that the cab that was involved in the accident 
was indeed a blue cab is  
 
(𝟎.𝟒𝟏𝟑)(𝟎.𝟖)
(𝟎.𝟒𝟏𝟑)(𝟎.𝟖)  +  (𝟎.𝟓𝟖𝟕)(𝟎.𝟐)
  =  0.737  (= 73.7%) .  
 
The correct conclusion is that probably a blue cab was involved in the accident. Under the 
circumstances of Example 2 the Blue Cab Company should be held accountable for damages. 
Many people might believe that with the testimony of two witnesses in Example 2 the assertion 
that a blue cab was involved must be true “beyond reasonable doubt”. Surprisingly this is not 
the case. In fact, the assertion is only true “on preponderance of probability”.  
 
Remarks  
 
(a) The methods used in [4] gave a conclusion to the case R v Blom (1939) AD188 that is 
different from the judgement in that case.  
 
(b) Not only should the man-in-the-street be informed of the outcome of legal proceedings, 
he should also be able to obtain a detailed exposition explaining exactly how evidence 
was weighed.  
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